Secure Transmission with Randomized Constellation Rotation for Downlink Sparse Code Multiple Access System by Lai, Ke et al.
2169-3536 (c) 2017 IEEE. Translations and content mining are permitted for academic research only. Personal use is also permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See
http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/ACCESS.2017.2772259, IEEE Access
1
Secure Transmission with Randomized
Constellation Rotation for Downlink Sparse Code
Multiple Access System
Ke Lai, Jing Lei, Lei Wen, Gaojie Chen Member, IEEE, Wei Li and Pei Xiao Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract—Sparse code multiple access (SCMA) is a promising
candidate air interface of next-generation mobile networks. In
this paper, we focus on a downlink SCMA system where a
transmitter sends confidential messages to multiple users in the
presence of external eavesdroppers. Consequently, we develop a
novel secure transmission approach over physical layer based on
a highly structured SCMA codebook design. In our proposed
scheme, we rotate the base constellations (BCs) with random
angles by extracting channel phases from the channel state in-
formation (CSI). By employing randomized constellation rotation
(RCR), the security of downlink SCMA can be ensured. In
addition, a tight SCMA upper bound is introduced to guide the
design of the encrypted codebook. As a result, we propose an
approach to avoid the significant error rate performance loss
caused by using codebooks that are designed using our method.
The proposed upper-bound-aided codebook design scheme can
select relatively good codebooks with low complexity. By com-
bining SCMA codebook design and secure communication, our
scheme ensures security for massive quantities of users with low
encrypted and decrypted complexity at the cost of transmission
rate and possible error rate performance loss. Moreover, the
proposed scheme can achieve robustness against channel estima-
tion errors. Analyses and Monte Carlo simulations confirm the
effectiveness of our scheme.
Index Terms—5G; secure communications; SCMA; constella-
tion rotation.
I. INTRODUCTION
S INCE the commercialization of 4th generation (4G) mo-bile networks, researchers have focused on the new air-
interface technology, which is more efficient and reliable, to
meet the demands of the 5th generation (5G) mobile networks
[1]. To further increase the spectral efficiency, non-orthogonal
multiple access (NOMA) is proposed as a supplement to
conventional orthogonal multiple access (OMA). Sparse code
multiple access (SCMA) [2] is a code domain NOMA that is
considered to be a promising 5G candidate due to its excellent
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ability to support massive quantities of users under heavily
loaded conditions1.
In the possible application scenarios for NOMA, such as
massive machine type of communication (mMTC), millions
of nodes must be accessed. Owing to the demands of ultra
low latency and low power consumption for the internet of
things (IoT), it is challenging to ensure the security in such
a huge network. Hence, new secure transmission approaches
that are adapted to NOMA should be considered. In this paper,
we focus on designing a secure transmission scheme for a
downlink SCMA system.
The concept of physical layer security (PLS) was initially
proposed by Wyner from an information theoretical perspec-
tive [3]. In recent years, PLS research has mainly focused on
the practical perspective [4]–[11]. It should be noted that PLS
does not compete with traditional cryptographic technologies
that are based on high computational complexity. The former
has complementary features and can be utilized to further
enhance the security level of existing communication systems
from the physical layer, which is independent of the higher
layers.
The first NOMA scheme was defined on the power domain,
and its secrecy outage probability was derived in [12], [13]. As
the authors noted, the secrecy performance of power-domain
NOMA networks is related to the scope of the protected zone
and user zone. In [14], a secure transmission scheme that
maximized the minimum confidential information rate among
users subject to the secrecy outage probability and transmitted
power constraints was proposed. In contrast to power-domain
NOMA, SCMA is a code-domain NOMA scheme that uses
the low-density signature (LDS) technique. To achieve better
error rate performance, the authors in [15] proposed shaping
gain through rotating the constellation points with a unitary
angle in the codebook design. Compared with OMA, NOMA
has greater ability to achieve overall multi-user capacity by
allowing overlap in specific dimensions.
Several PLS studies apply rotation to ensure the security of
communication without loss of secrecy capacity [16]. In [17],
the authors proposed rotation of the original symbols with
random phases in a massive MIMO system to protect against
eavesdroppers with a large number of antennas. A method
for encrypting the modulation by simultaneously changing the
1Overloading is referred to as the case where the number of users supported
by the system is greater than the number of OFDMA subcarriers.
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amplitudes and phases on the constellation was proposed in
[18].
Inspired by the highly structured SCMA codebook, we
combine constellation rotation and secure transmission of
SCMA to produce a randomized constellation-rotation-based
SCMA (RCR-SCMA) scheme. Our proposed scheme is con-
ceived to support downlink communications in heavily loaded
environments with superior security. In summary, the novelties
of the paper are as follows:
 An RCR-SCMA scheme is proposed for secure trans-
mission in a downlink SCMA system. Aiming to ensure
the security of massive quantities of users, we introduce
the RCR into the design of SCMA codebooks to protect
confidential information with low encrypted complexity.
Although several works on conventional SCMA code-
book design have been proposed [19]–[21], they mainly
focus on improving the error rate performance: none
discuss the feasibility of using SCMA codebooks to
ensure security. To the best of our knowledge, there
does not exist a secure SCMA transmission scheme that
combines RCR and codebook design.
 The idea behind RCR-SCMA is that legitimate users
(LUs) and eavesdroppers have asymmetry knowledge
about the channel; therefore, channel key generation
[22]–[24] can also be applied in our proposed scheme
2. Because RCR is utilized, RCR-SCMA may result in
performance loss compared with the conventional SCMA
codebook in [15]. To minimize the performance loss,
we design the codebook according to the tight upper
bound in [25]. Consequently, we introduce a parameter to
roughly estimate the performance of encrypted codebooks
with low computational complexity. This method is useful
in designing an RCR-SCMA codebook with acceptable
performance loss. As far as we know, no such upper-
bound-aided codebook design has been proposed.
 To investigate the security and reliability of RCR-SCMA,
we analyze the impact of imperfect channel estima-
tion. Monte Carlo simulations and derived formulas both
show that RCR-SCMA can achieve robustness against
imperfect channel estimation under certain conditions.
Moreover, based on the features of the message passing
algorithm (MPA), we find that the security of conven-
tional SCMA is strongly related to the proposed inse-
cure rotated angle (IRA). Further analysis shows that
conventional SCMA has poor secrecy performance, even
though the codebook is unknown to the eavesdropper. The
parameters that influence the IRA are derived from both
simulation results and deduced formulas. The decrypted
complexity and two possible attack models of RCR-
SCMA are also analyzed to highlight its high security.
Such a systematic analysis on the security of SCMA has
not been reported previously.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In section
II, we briefly introduce downlink SCMA. The RCR-SCMA
2In this paper, we propose to encrypt the codebook by using the channel
phase that extracting from CSI. It should be noted that other channel key
generation techniques are also applicable. However, the discussion of this
problem is beyond the scope of this paper
codebook design scheme is proposed in section III. Section
IV presents the step-by-step process of transmitting a block in
RCR-SCMA. The simulation results and secrecy analysis are
discussed in section V and section VI, respectively. Section
VII concludes this paper.
II. SPARSE CODE MULTIPLE ACCESS
A brief introduction of downlink SCMA and the detection
algorithm based on the message passing algorithm (MPA) at
the receiver is presented in this section.
A downlink SCMA system where a base station (BS)
communicates with J users is depicted in Fig. 1. For the
jth user, every m = log2(M) bits of user j directly map
to a K-dimensional SCMA codeword, where M denotes the
constellation size. For simplicity, the codeword of the jth user
is denoted as cj = [c
j
1; c
j
2;    ; cjK ]T . As shown in Fig. 1,
all users’ codewords are superposed at the transmitter. In this
paper, fJg and fKg represent the user nodes set and the chip
nodes set, respectively.
Fig. 1: SCMA downlink system
SCMA is defined by an indicator sparse matrix FKJ
that has dc non-zero elements in each row and du non-zero
elements in each column. FKJ = (f1;f2; : : : ;fJ ), where
fj = (fj;1; fj;2;    ; fj;k)T ; fj;k = 1 denotes that the jth
user is spread by the kth chip. Due to the sparsity of FKJ ,
SCMA can also be represented by a Tanner graph [26].
For a conventional SCMA system with 4 chips and 6 users,,
the indicator matrix can be represented as:
F 46 =
2664
0 1 1 0 1 0
1 0 1 0 0 1
0 1 0 1 0 1
1 0 0 1 1 0
3775 (1)
The non-zero elements in F 46 represent the connection
between user nodes and chip nodes, which indicate that the
jth user is spread by the kth chip. We assume that the numbers
of non-zeros in each column and each row are the same.
Therefore, the received signal at BS can be written as:
yj = diag(hj)
JX
j=1
cj + z (2)
where diag(hj) is a diagonal matrix, vector cj is the SCMA
codeword of the jth user, yj = [yj1; y
j
2;    ; yjK ]T is the signal
vector received by jth LU, hj = [hj1; h
j
2;    ; hjK ]T is the
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channel gain between user j and the transmitter, and z is
Gaussian noise with variance 2.
Due to the sparsity of the indicator matrix in (1), MPA
can be utilized as a detection algorithm at the receiver. The
logarithm domain MPA, which is denoted as Max-Log (ML),
for SCMA detection is given in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 ML detection for SCMA
1: Inputs: yjk; h
j
k
2: for iter = 1;    ; iter num do
3: Initialization:
Vuc[] = 0;  2 constellation
4: for k = 1 : K do
5: for j = 1 : du do
6: for  = 1 : M do
7: Lc[] =
1
2
kyjk  
P
hjkx
j
kk
8: end for
9: end for
10: Lc[] = max
c2K
(Lc[])
11: end for
12: Chip nodes update:
Ucu[] = Lc[] +
duP
t=1;t6=u
Vtc[])
 2 constellation; t = 1;    ; du.
13: User nodes update:
Vuc[] =
dcP
t=1;t6=u
Utu[]
 2 constellation; t = 1;    ; dc:
14: Decision:
Lu[^] = max
u2J
(
duP
t=1
Utu[]):
15: end for
where yjk is the received signal of jth user on the kth sub-
carrier, hjk and c
j
k represent the path loss of the jth user and
the kth component of the jth SCMA codeword, respectively.
k  k is the norm that represents the Euclidean distance. ^ is
the tentative detected symbol. Note that ML is an iterative
algorithm that has computational complexity order O(Mdc)
for chip node updating.
III. RCR-SCMA CODEBOOK DESIGN
The RCR-SCMA codebook design and its upper bound are
developed in this section.
A. System model
It can be inferred that when the codebooks of the transmitter
and eavedroppers do not match, the eavesdroppers cannot
receive the correct information. As a result, if the base station
(BS) and the users share a codebook that the eavesdroppers
cannot obtain, the communication security between the BS and
LUs can be ensured. Therefore, in this paper, we aim to design
codebooks with the following characteristics: (1) high security
with low encrypted and decrypted complexity compare to
conventional cryptographic technologies; and (2) lower error
rate performance loss that will not significantly cinfluence the
reliability of SCMA under overloading conditions.
Taking the 4-point RCR-SCMA as an example, the process
of the encrypted codebook design is shown in Fig. 2. A pair
of random angles ((i)1 ; 
(i)
2 ); i = 1; 2 is used to rotate the
original base constellations (BCs), where (i)1 ; 
(i)
2 2 [0; 2]
and (i)1 6= (i)2 . The received signals at the jth user’s receiver
can be written as:
yj = diag(hj)
JX
j=1
E(cj ; (i)1 ; (i)2 ) + z (3)
where E(cj ; (i)1 ; (i)2 ) is the encrypted RCR-SCMA codeword,
which can be regarded as a function of cj ; 
(i)
1 and 
(i)
2 .
At the receiver’s side, the LUs use the rotated codebook
to detect the information; hence, the calculation of Lc[] in
Algorithm 1 can be rewritten as
Lc[] =
1
2
kyjk  
P
hjk; E(cjk; (i)1 ; (i)2 )k (4)
Note that (i)1 and 
(i)
2 are unknown to the eavesdroppers
because the rotated angles are changed based on the CSI,
which varies independently over time. Moreover, as the CSI
is a distant-independent parameter, it is almost impossible for
eavesdroppers to predict it. Therefore, the eavesdropper cannot
intercept RCR-SCMA codewords E(cjk; (i)1 ; (i)2 ) to detect
the data. Consequently, Lc[] cannot be calculated correctly,
which indicates that the initial message to process MPA is
incorrect.
B. RCR-based encrypted codebook design
To maximize the minimum product distance, a unitary
rotation of base constellation (BC) is utilized in conventional
SCMA codebook design. For the sake of designing a codebook
to ensure security, we propose randomization the rotation of
each point on the BCs rather than the fixed angle rotation in
conventional SCMA. Such a method can protect confidential
data at the cost of possible performance loss. In contrast to
conventional SCMA codebook design, each constellation point
on the BC corresponds to an independent rotation angle in
RCR-SCMA. Considering the 16-point codebook design, the
rotation of each constellation point can be expressed as:
(Xi; Yi) = (xi; yi) Ri for i = 1; 2; 3; 4 (5)
where (xi; yi) is the original coordinate of each point on the
BC; (Xi; Yi) is the coordinate after rotating each point on the
BC; (d(i)x ; d
(i)
y ) = (jxij; jyij); and Ri is the rotation matrix,
which can be denoted as:
Ri =

cos(i)   sin(i)
sin(i) cos(i)

: (6)
The BC in 16-point RCR-SCMA after rotation using our
scheme is shown in Fig. 3. As depicted in Fig. 3, each BC
applies a different rotation to generate the encrypted MCs.
Such operations aim to enhance the security. According to
(5), d(i)x and d
(i)
y can be calculated by a single rotation matrix
in conventional SCMA codebook design for an implemented
unitary rotation. In RCR-SCMA, d(i)x and d
(i)
y of each rotated
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Fig. 2: Process for 4-point RCR-SCMA codebook design
constellation point corresponds to different Ri. Therefore,
there are at most 2  log2M pairs of (d(i)x ; d(i)y ). For simplicity,
we define a universal set U that consists of all d(i)x and d
(i)
y .
Fig. 3: Rotation of two base constellations
As a result, the shuffling in RCR-SCMA codebook design
is different from that of conventional SCMA. For convenience,
we define two sets as follws:
N = min
i=12log2M
(log2M)fUg
M = max
i=12log2M
(log2M)fUg = {UN (7)
where N is a set that depends on the log2M minimum
distances from both d(i)x and d
(i)
y , andM is the complementary
set of N . In 16-point RCR-SCMA, we randomly select
1
2  log2M elements from each set to be the real and imaginary
parts of the MCs. The encrypted MCs are depicted in Fig. 4.
Fig. 4: Encrypted mother constellations based on a 16-point SCMA
system
As we can see from Fig. 4, after applying rotation to the two
BCs, the lattice structure is not fixed, i.e., both the mappings of
the symbols and the amplitude of each constellation point on
the MCs are different when the rotated angle changes. More-
over, each user randomly uses two different MCs to generate
RCR-SCMA codewords. Therefore, the three dimensions of
information in the RCR-SCMA codebook are hidden by only
performing rotations on the BCs. To sum up, the encryption
of the RCR-SCMA is multi-dimensional.
C. Upper-bound-aided RCR-SCMA codebook design
As noted by [15], the performance of conventional SCMA is
dominated by the codebook design, specifically, by the rotated
angle of the BCs. As we have mentioned, our approach may
affect the error rate performance. Therefore, it is necessary to
study the upper bound of our scheme.
The authors in [25] found that the average symbol error rate
(SER) of user j in SCMA can be tightly upper bounded by:
Pj(e)  1
MJ
X
Xc
0@ X
Xd;x
j
c 6=xjd
PfXc !Xdg
1A (8)
where M is the size of the constellation, and J is the number
of users. PfXc ! Xdg is the pairwise error probability
(PEP), which can be further upper bounded by:
PfXc !Xdg 
NX
i=1
ai
KY
k=1
2N0
2N0 + bi2k
(9)
A tight upper bound over the Rayleigh fading channel can
be found when N = 2, a1 = 112 , a2 =
1
4 , b1 =
1
2 , and
b2 =
2
3 . Note that N0 is the noise variance, and 
2
k is the kth
dimension-wise distance for the SCMA, which is defined as:
2k =
JX
j=1
jxj;c[k]  xj;d[k]j2 (10)
where xj;c[k] and xj;d[k] are the kth entries of the jth user’s
signal vector, corresponding to two superimposed signals Xc
and Xd, respectively.
According to [25], (8) and (9) are good estimations of the
SCMA error rate. However, the calculation of (8) is compu-
tationally expensive, especially when the number of users is
large. Hence, a simple method to estimate the performance of
the encrypted codebook is necessary to adapt our secure trans-
mission scheme. As shown in (9), the error rate performance
of SCMA is strongly influenced by 2k. The larger the 
2
k is,
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the lower the error rate will be. Furthermore, 2k is entirely
depending on the codebook, as shown in (10). Therefore, 2k
is an important parameter to estimate the performance of the
codebook.
To apply this upper bound to our secure scheme to minimize
the performance loss with the smallest possible computa-
tional complexity, we define a reference codebook whose kth
dimension-wise distance is denoted as 2k;ref . Moreover, we
define a ratio  that is related to the PEP of the reference
codebook and candidate encrypted codebook:
 =
P
Xc
0@ P
Xd;x
j
c 6=xjd
NP
i=1
ai
KQ
k=1
2N0
2N0 + bi2k
1A
P
Xc
0@ P
Xd;x
j
c 6=xjd
NP
i=1
ai
KQ
k=1
2N0
2N0 + bi2k;ref
1A (11)
where ai and bi are the same for both the reference and
candidate encrypted codebooks. These two paramters can be
regarded as constants in the reference codebook. After some
simplification and rearrangement, (11) can be rewritten as:
 =
1
pref
P
Xc
0@ P
Xd;x
j
c 6=xjd
NP
i=1
ai
KQ
k=1
1
1 + bick
1A (12)
where ck =
2k
2N0
. Note that it can be regarded as a constant
when the SNR is fixed. pref is a constant that is related to the
reference codebook. We aim to estimate the relative perfor-
mance of a candidate codebook. Without loss of generality,
we consider the simplest case with only two users in the
calculation of the PEP3. Based on (12),  can be regarded
as a function of ck; hence, the upper bound of PEP can be
decomposed into the summation of two parts as:
 =
1
pref
P
Xc
0@ P
Xd;x
j
c 6=xjd
a1
KQ
k=1
1
1 + b1ck
1A+
1
pref
P
Xc
0@ P
Xd;x
j
c 6=xjd
a2
KQ
k=1
1
1 + b2ck
1A : (13)
These two parts in the above formula have the same
monotonicity; therefore, we only have to calculate one of them.
Consequently, we can obtain the reference ratio  ref :
 ref =
P
Xc
0@ P
Xd;x
j
c 6=xjd
KQ
k=1
(1 + ckb1)
 1
1A
P
Xc
0@ P
Xd;x
j
c 6=xjd
KQ
k=1
(1 + ck;refb1) 1
1A : (14)
Although the actual SER relationship between candidate
codebook and reference codebook cannot be obtained using
(14), it can reflect the performance of a candidate codebook
relative to a reference codebook. In this paper, we consider
3The reason why such an approximation can be made is that the gap
between the upper bound and simulation result for both 2 users and 6 users
are almost the same as reported in [25]
the conventional Tanner graph with 4 chips and 6 users. The
codebook in [15] is chosen as the reference codebook; hence,
the denominator of (14) can be calculated directly. For 4-point
and 16-point SCMA codebooks, we have:
 ref;4 =
1
0:0383
P
Xc
0@ P
Xd;x
j
c 6=xjd
KQ
k=1
(1 + ckb1)
 1
1A (15)
and
 ref;16 =
1
0:1320
P
Xc
0@ P
Xd;x
j
c 6=xjd
KQ
k=1
(1 + ckb1)
 1
1A (16)
Where  ref;4 and  ref;16 are the reference ratio for 4-point
and 16-point RCR-SCMA codebook, respectively. Note that
(15) and (16) are both obtained at Eb=N0 =18 dB over a
Rayleigh fading channel. This is related to the fact that the
upper bound is sufficiently tight at high Eb=N0, as reported in
[25]; hence, the estimation is accurate. Obviously,  ref > 0
when  ref 2 (0; 1), and we can infer that the performance
of the candidate codebook is better than that of the reference
codebook. The candidate codebook has a worse performance
when  ref 2 (1;1).
When the SNR is high, which indicates that ck  1, we can
make an approximation that is strictly larger than the original
 :
 / 1
pref
P
Xc
0@ P
Xd;x
j
c 6=xjd
a1
KQ
k=1
1
b1ck
1A+
1
pref
P
Xc
0@ P
Xd;x
j
c 6=xjd
a2
KQ
k=1
1
b2ck
1A (17)
Furthermore, from (17), we can also obtain:
 ref 
P
Xc
0@ P
Xd;x
j
c 6=xjd
KQ
k=1
(ckb1)
 1
1A
P
Xc
0@ P
Xd;x
j
c 6=xjd
KQ
k=1
(ck;ref b1) 1
1A : (18)
According to (17) and (18), the candidate codebook can
achieve the same performance as the reference codebook
by substituting ck   
1
K
ref into ck. Moreover, we know that
ck =
2k
2N0
and N0 = (log2M  10
Eb=N0
10 ) 1. Therefore, the
increment of Eb=N0 required to achieve the same performance
as that of the reference codebook can be written as:

Eb
N0
 10  log10  
1
K
ref : (19)
It is noted that (19) is a good approximation when the SNR is
within the region of high values. Therefore, we can estimate
the performance loss between the reference codebook and
the candidate encrypted codebook. This conclusion can be
extended to the case of multiple users; however, it should be
noted that the performance loss calculated by (19) is merely
an approximation, i.e., it reflects only the relative performance
of a candidate codebook.
2169-3536 (c) 2017 IEEE. Translations and content mining are permitted for academic research only. Personal use is also permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See
http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/ACCESS.2017.2772259, IEEE Access
6
TABLE I: SUCCESS RATE OF CONSTRUCTING AN ENCRYPTED CODEBOOK
M
 ref 1.05 1.1 1.15 1.2 1.25 1.3 1.35 1.4 1.45 1.5 1.55
M = 4 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
M = 16 45.44% 60.40% 70.44% 77.64% 84.08% 85.96% 87.64% 89.36% 91.04% 92.56% 93.60%
We test 106 different codebooks for 4-point and 16-point
RCR-SCMA under several values of  ref , and the results
are presented in Table I. The success rate reaches 100%
even if  ref is very small in 4-point RCR-SCMA, which
indicates that the possibility of designing a codebook with
slight performance loss is high. For the 16-point codebook,
the success rate is only 84.08% when  ref = 1:25. To obtain
a high success rate, we choose a relatively high  ref in this
paper to achieve better trade-off between the success rate
and the codebooks’ performance. As for 4-point RCR-SCMA,
 ref is chosen to be 1.05, and the performance loss relative
to the reference codebook is only 0.053 dB according to
(19). For 16-point RCR-SCMA, we choose  ref = 1:5. After
simulation and calculation, the success rate and performance
loss are 92:56% and 0.44 dB, respectively.
IV. SECURE TRANSMISSION FOR DOWNLINK SCMA
The process of downlink RCR-SCMA is presented in this
section.
A. Channel phase estimation
Without loss of generality, we consider a downlink channel
where a BS is communicating with J users. First, the activated
LUs use the reference codebook to transmit the communica-
tion requests to the BS simultaneously. We assume that the
BS has knowledge of the CSI. In general, the channel matrix
received by BS can be written as:
H = [h1;h2;    ;hJ ] (20)
where hj = (h1;j ; h2;j ;   hK;j)T , and hk;j 2 C. It is clear
that the BS can extract at most K channel phases from each
LU because a K-dimensional SCMA codeword is used.
The worst case is that the eavesdropper can intercept the
training bits. Under these circumstances, the CSI between the
eavesdropper and the LUs can be fully estimated. However, the
main channel vector hj is still unknown to the eavesdropper
as all the channels are independent.
B. Rotating the constelltion randomly
Secondly, after the channel matrix is estimated, the BS
selects enough elements from H to construct an RCR-SCMA
codebook. As a result, the encrypted codebook can be gener-
ated by the method proposed in section III-B.
It should be noted that a mapping between the index of
the selected hk;j and the constellation points on the BC,
which is unknown to the eavesdropper, has to be determined
previously. We calculate the parameter  ref according to (15)
and (16) when the encrypted codebook is designed. When
 ref 2 (0; 1:05) and  ref 2 (0; 1:5) for 4-point and 16-point
RCR-SCMA, respectively, the constructed codebook can be
used in the secure transmission. If these conditions are not
satisfied, it is necessary to adjust the angles and retransmit the
training bits to obtain a new channel matrix. Note that if the
number of selected channel phases 8 > cp  4, the appointed
mapping between the index of hk;j and the constellation points
which is pre-defined on the two BCs should be different
because the number of selected hk;j is not sufficient to rotate
two BCs with different angles.
The BS performs the RCR and other computations, such
as the calculation of 2k and  ref , locally and quietly. These
operations do not radiate any signals; hence, the eavesdroppers
cannot intercept any information from the BS.
C. Selected channel phase broadcasting
Third, when the RCR process is finished, the BS broadcasts
the selected channel phase to all the terminals with a symbol
rotation according to the current CSI, which can be written
as:
srot;j = sj  e\hk;j (21)
where srot;j and sj are the rotated symbol and original sym-
bol, respectively. hk;j is the kth component of hj . Hence, the
jth LUs can recover the hj based on the rotated signals with
an inverse rotation. We assume that the channel is correctly
estimated. It should be noted that the BS should broadcast the
signals within the coherence interval.
After receiving the signals broadcasted by the BS, LU j can
recover the encrypted codebook. We note that all the terminals,
including the eavesdropper, can receive the signals containing
selected channel phase.
We consider the worst case where the eavesdropper is able
to receive the broadcasted signal perfectly. Moreover, it can
also estimate the CSI between itself and the BS. However,
the eavesdropper still cannot extract any information about the
secret key, as clarified in the channel phase estimation process.
D. Transmitted information recovery
Finally, the BS sends the information encrypted by RCR-
SCMA codebook to the LUs, as shown in Fig. 1. According to
(3), each user recovers the information bits by the encrypted
codebook and MPA. To further enhance the security, the secret
key should change over time by transmitting training bits to
obtain a new channel matrix.
When transmitting information from the BS to LUs, we
assume that the eavesdroppers can receive superposed sig-
nals and apply MPA to detect the information. However, no
information can be recovered because E in (4) is unknown
to the eavesdropper. Considering the worst case where even
the mapping between hk;j and the constellation points on
the BC is intercepted by eavesdroppers, the eavesdropper can
hardly intercept the transmitted information. This is related to
the following facts: (1) The data are transmitted out of the
coherence interval, and the CSI between the BS and LUs is
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not fixed. Hence, the eavesdroppers can only apply exhaustive
search on secret keys or information. (2) The computational
complexity of MPA is dominated by O(Mdc), so the cost
of exhaustive search is extremely high, especially in large-
scale networks. (3) The encrypted codebook changes over
time; hence, a data packet is transmitted by many encrypted
codebooks as sufficient channel phases can be extracted before
communicating. Therefore, eavesdroppers can hardly intercept
any useful data.
V. DISCUSSION AND SIMULATION RESULTS
The Monte Carlo simulation of the error rate performance
of RCR-SCMA is reported in this section, along with a
theoretical discussion and analysis.
A. Analysis of the insecure rotated angle
As noted in [27], [28], the error rate performance can be
used to assess the security of a system. According to (4), MPA
is based on the Euclidean distance between a superposed signal
and its corresponding codewords in the codebook. Based on
this information, it can be inferred that the eavesdropper
can recover partial information with deviated rotated angles
rather than the completely accurate angles in a conventional
SCMA system, even though the codebook is unknown to
the eavesdropper. Therefore, to illustrate that our scheme is
superior to the conventional one, it is necessary to analyze the
security of the LUs when the eavesdroppers apply exhaustive
search to find the correct conventional codebook.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Deviation of rotated angle (degree)
10-5
10-4
10-3
10-2
10-1
100
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Eb/N0=26dB
Fig. 5: The BER of an eavesdropper using a deviated SCMA
codebook for 16-point SCMA
Fig. 5 shows the BER performance of eavesdroppers versus
the deviation of the actual rotated angle for different Eb=N0
in an uncoded conventional SCMA system over the SUI-3
channel. The BER curves are monotonically increasing, which
indicates that the eavesdropper can intercept information if it
can guess the rotated angle within a range. We denote this
range as the insecure rotated angle (IRA) for the LUs, which
can be defined as:
P (C;G(C;Ri +Ri)) < p (22)
where P is the BER that the eavesdropper uses a deviated
codebook to detect, and p represents a threshold of P , which is
unacceptable for the LUs. C denotes the transmitted codebook
corresponding to the rotation matrix Ri. G is an operator that
transforms a conventional codebook into a deviated one. In this
paper, we consider that the Ri satisfying (22) is the IRA.
As shown in Fig. 5, if p = 0:1, then the maximum deviation
of the rotated angle is 10 degrees.
As for conventional codebook design, the effect of IRA will
be significant because a unitary rotation is applied. In other
words, even though the conventional codebook is unknown to
the eavesdropper, the search space to decrypt the conventional
codebook shrinks due to the IRA. In RCR-SCMA, the IRA
has a small effect on the secrecy performance because a
randomized rotation is applied to each point of the BC.
In addition, when Eb=N0 is high, the BER rapidly converges
to a high value as the deviation of angle increases; however,
when Eb=N0 is low, the degradation of the BER performance
is not sensitive to the deviation of the actual rotated angle.
In other words, as Eb=N0 increases, the BER performance
deteriorates more rapidly. This observation is a reminder
that the range of IRA decreases at low Eb=N0. Nonetheless,
the eavesdroppers can analyze the actual codebook due to
the significant variation of BER, even though the codebook
slightly deviates at high Eb=N0 in a conventional SCMA
system.
Furthermore, we also investigate the IRA theoretically.
Considering the Euclidean distance between received signals
and corresponding codebooks, which is the initial message in
MPA processing, clearly, the BER is strongly related to the
initial message. If the constellation does not deviate at the
receiver, we have:
d =
1
2
kyjk  
P
hjk; c
j
kk =
1
2
kyjk   h  ck: (23)
Where c and h are the vector form of SCMA codeword and
its corresponding CSI, respectively. Once the constellation at
the transmitter is rotated, we can model the deviated angle as
an error term on c at the receiver, which can be written as:
d^ =
1
2
kyjk   h  (c+c)k: (24)
Therefore, the impact of asymmetry knowledge of the code-
book can be modeled as:
jd  d^j = j 1
2
kyjk   h  ck  
1
2
kyjk   h  (c+c)kj
(25)
Note that although jd  d^j does not equal to the error rate, it
reflects the tendency of the error rate. For simplicity, (25) can
be written as:
jdj = ky
j
kk
2
jk1  h  ckyjkk
k   k1  h  (c+c)kyjkk
kj: (26)
By applying the norm-inequality on (26), we have:
jdj  ky
j
kk
2
kh ckyjkk
k: (27)
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The Cauchy-Schwarz inequality can be applied on (27):
jdj  ky
j
kk
2
kh ckyjkk
k  ky
j
kk
2
khk  kck
kyjkk
: (28)
Therefore,
jdj  ky
j
kk
2
khk
kyjkk
kck: (29)
where ky
j
kk
2 is related to the signal-to-noise ratio, and
khk
kyjkk
can be regarded as a constant after the superposed signals are
received. Hence, (29) can be rewritten as:
jdj  c  10SNR20 kck: (30)
where c is a constant, and SNR is the signal-to-noise ratio,
which is an exponential function. Hence, the SNR is a dom-
inant factor when it is sufficiently large, i.e., even a small
deviation of the angle has a significant impact on jdj. If the
SNR is small, the variation of jdj mainly depends on the
factor kxk. As we can see, the tendency of our theoretical
result is the same as that of the simulation result shown in
Fig. 5, i.e., the degradation of BER is faster at high Eb=N0.
As the constant c is related to the channel gain h, it can
be inferred that the IRA will decrease when h is large. It
should be stressed out again that the result shown in (30) is
an approximation of the impact of IRA, it only reflects the
error rate tendency when using a deviated conventional SCMA
codebook to detect the received signal.
According to the results, we can conclude that the eaves-
dropper can obtain partial information when the unitary rotated
angle is within the IRA region. Therefore, the security of
conventional SCMA is poor due to the existence of the IRA.
The analysis also shows that the IRA is related to the CSI.
B. Impact of imperfect channel estimation
From the above discussion, we assume that both the BS
and LUs have the knowledge about channel phase exactly.
However, estimation error cannot be avoided in real systems.
Therefore, the analysis of imperfect estimation is necessary to
verify the impact of the BER performance on the LUs.
We assume that the CSI estimation of the BS is correct
when the LUs transmit training bits. Therefore, the BS can
extract the angles as follows:
 = arctan
=[h]
<[h]

(31)
where  and h are the actual angle and channel gain, respec-
tively. < and = are the real and imaginary parts of a complex
number, respectively. However, when the BS broadcasts sig-
nals containing rotated channel phases, the LUs may estimate
the channel with error and cannot recover the rotated angles
perfectly. The estimated error of channel can be modeled as:
h^ = h+h (32)
where h^ and h are the estimated CSI and actual CSI, respec-
tively. h denotes the error of the CSI estimation, which we
model as a random variable that follows the complex Gaussian
distribution CN (0; 2) according to [29]. Note that the CSI is
still assumed to be unchanged within the coherence interval;
the error is only caused by imperfect estimation. Thus, the
estimated angle can be written as:
^ = arctan
 
=[h^]
<[h^]
!
= arctan
=[h+h]
<[h+h]

: (33)
We aim to obtain a simple formula to determine the im-
pact of estimation error on the rotated angles. Consider the
increment between  and ^:
 = ^    = arctan
=[h+h]
<[h+h]

  arctan
=[h]
<[h]

:
(34)
According to the characteristics of the arctan function, (34)
can be written as:
 = arctan
0BB@
=[h+h]
<[h+h]  
=[h]
<[h]
1 +
=[h+h]=[h]
<[h+h]<[h]
1CCA : (35)
After doing some algebra, we obtain:
 =
arctan
 =[h]<[h] <[h]=[h]
<[h](<[h] + <[h]) + =[h](=[h] + =[h])

:
(36)
When <[h]  <[h] and =[h]  =[h], we can make
following approximation:
 . arctan

1
khk2 (=[h]<[h] <[h]=[h])

= arctan
0BB@
=[h]
Im[h]
  <[h]<[h]
<[h]
=[h] +
=[h]
<[h]
1CCA
 arctan
0BB@
=[h]
=[h]  
<[h]
<[h]
2
1CCA :
(37)
Furthermore, we can obtain an upper bound of :
 . arctan
 =[h]
2  =[h]

  arctan
 <[h]
2  <[h]

(38)
(38) reflects the impact of imperfect channel estimation on the
possible rotated angle. An important observation in (38) is that
the estimation error of CSI has a slight impact on the rotated
angle, especially when the modulus of h is low.
We adopt SUI-3 as the channel model with Eb=N0=14
dB, 16 dB and 18 dB for both uncoded 4-point and 16-
point RCR-SCMA. The variance of h is normalized to 1
in the simulations, and each component of hj has different
estimation error. As shown in Fig. 6 and Fig. 7, we find that
the impact of the estimation error on BER is not significant
for both the 4-point and 16-point RCR-SCMA at low variance
of h, which can also be explained by (38). Additionally,
the estimation error results in more significant degradation
on BER for 16-point RCR-SCMA while the BER of 4-point
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Fig. 6: The impact of the channel estimation error on BER for 4-point
RCR-SCMA
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Fig. 7: The impact of the channel estimation error on BER for 16-
point RCR-SCMA
RCR-SCMA remains stable for all simulated variances of h.
Therefore, RCR-SCMA is robust against the estimation error
of the channel phase. This conclusion is meaningful for the
actual implementation because the rotated angles are extracted
from the channel.
It should be noted that the deviation caused by the esti-
mation error of the CSI at the LUs’ receiver may result in
variation of the symbol mapping on the MCs. Taking the 4-
point RCR-SCMA as an example, we show a possible case
where the mapping of symbols on the MC is affected by the
estimation error in Fig. 8. As shown in the figure, if the MC is
constructed without error, then d(1)y > d
(2)
y . However, because
estimation error exists, we find that
^
d
(1)
y <
^
d
(2)
y in reality.
Therefore, one of the MCs is different from the original one
with respect to both amplitude and mapping of symbols, which
results in error rate performance loss. A similar analysis can
be applied to the 16-point RCR-SCMA.
Fig. 8: Impact of estimation error on projection
According to the simulation results shown in Table II, if the
estimation error changes the mapping of symbols on the MC,
the LUs cannot receive any information. In this case, the CSI
estimation error significantly influences the reliability. Hence,
we can conclude that the error rate performance of LUs mainly
depends on the mapping of symbols on MCs when the user
cannot estimate the CSI correctly to recover the codebook used
by the BS.
TABLE II: ERROR RATE OF LU FOR 4-POINT RCR-SCMA
WITH IMPERFECT CSI ESTIMATION
Errorrate
Eb=N0 0 dB 2 dB 6 dB 10 dB
BER 0.5001 0.4998 0.5001 0.5004
FER 0.9984 0.9981 0.9977 0.9980
C. Numerical results
The error rate performance of downlink SCMA systems
(including parameters K = 4; J = 6; dc = 3; du =
2;max(Niter) = 6;  = 150%) is evaluated over the SUI-
3 channel. The SCMA indicator matrix F 46 in formula (1)
with M = 4 and M = 16 are utilized for the simulations.
The reference codebook is designed according to [15]. In this
subsection, we assume that both the LUs and eavesdroppers
can obtain correct knowledge of the CSI. Binary LDPC code
with length N = 256 and rate r = 0:5 is used as the channel
code.
Error rate comparisons of the first user for 4-point and
16-point downlink RCR-SCMA and conventional SCMA are
shown in Fig. 9 and Fig. 10. Because the rotated angles
are random, the RCR-SCMA performance varies. The per-
formance of RCR-SCMA with secret key-1 is slightly worse
than that of conventional SCMA. The performance loss is
acceptable due to the introduction of the upper-bound-related
parameter  ref . Moreover, RCR-SCMA performs even better
than conventional SCMA under some circumstances. This
phenomenon can be explained by the proposed upper-bound-
aided codebook design scheme and Table I, namely, the actual
 ref of a candidate codebook can be less than 1. Furthermore,
it is clear that eavesdroppers cannot obtain any information.
In Figs. 11 and 12, we illustrate the feasibility of our
scheme to ensure the security of different users. As shown
in the figures, the gap between the best user and the worst
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TABLE III: SEARCHING SPACE COMPARISON PER BLOCK
Order
Scheme Conventional SCMA RCR-SCMA
4-point (Nadditions +Nmultiplications)  ( 360 ) (Nadditions +Nmultiplications)  2  (2  ( 360 )2)
 4
2
2
16-point (Nadditions +Nmultiplications)  ( 360 ) (Nadditions +Nmultiplications)  2  (2  ( 360 )4)
 8
2
2
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Fig. 9: Performance comparison of legitimate users and an eaves-
dropper for 4-point SCMA
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Fig. 10: Performance comparison of legitimate users and an eaves-
dropper for 16-point SCMA
user is nearly 0.8 dB and 1 dB at a BER of 10 4 for 4-
point and 16-point RCR-SCMA, respectively. The CSI of
the BS and LUs are different. resulting in the performance
gap. However, each user uses independent CSI to recover the
information transmitted from the BS and has nearly the same
BER performance. Therefore, the security and reliability of
each user in the network can both be guaranteed by using
RCR-SCMA.
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Fig. 11: Performance comparison of different legitimate users for 4-
point RCR-SCMA
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Fig. 12: Performance comparison of different legitimate users for
16-point RCR-SCMA
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF RCR-SCMA
The security of RCR-SCMA will be discussed from two
aspects in this section.
A. The decrypted complexity of RCR-SCMA
The decrypted complexity for an eavesdropper is an impor-
tant factor to measure the secrecy performance. In this subsec-
tion, we focus on analyzing the decrypted complexity when
an exhaustive search is applied to searching for the correct
codebook for both RCR-SCMA and conventional SCMA.
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Considering the characteristics of a downlink SCMA sys-
tem, the eavesdropper can only receive the superposed signals
of all active LUs; hence, the MPA should be utilized to detect
the data. We first discuss the SCMA codebook designed in the
conventional way. We assume that the codebook is unknown to
the eavesdropper; however, the design rule of the conventional
SCMA codebook is known to the eavesdropper. Therefore, an
exhaustive search for the rotated angle of the BC can be used
to recover the transmitted data. We set the step size in the
search as  degree; then, the eavesdropper needs at most 360
detection attempts to obtain the codebook, regardless of the
IRA. Furthermore, the conventional codebook is fixed in an
SCMA system; hence, the eavesdropper can receive sufficient
signals and decrypt the data by searching for the correct
codebook. After the codebook is decrypted, all the messages
transmitted between the LUs and BS will be intercepted by the
eavesdropper. Therefore, the security of conventional SCMA
is poor.
According to section II, the process of RCR-SCMA code-
book design can be summarized as Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 RCR-SCMA codebook design
1: Key generation according to section IV
2: Initializations: hk;j , Base constellations
3: k;j = arctan(=[hk;j ]=<[hk;j ])
4: do f : k;j ! BCs
5: generate
N = min
i=12log2M
(log2M)fUg
M = max
i=12log2M
(log2M)fUg
6: do shuffling according to steps 4 and 5
7: calculate
 ref according to (14)
8: if ( ref 2 (0;  th))
Output: MCs
else
return to step 1
9: end if
10: end
After the CSI is estimated, K channel phases are obtained
from each LU because K-dimensional SCMA codewords are
utilized. The decrypted complexity is related to the number of
used channel phases, namely cp, that selecting from H . To
evaluate the search space of 16-point RCR-SCMA, we have
to consider the following three cases:
1) cp = 4: In this case, only 4 hk;j are extracted from
the channel. Hence, we need to apply different mappings
between the index of hk;j and the two BCs in this case.
Under these circumstances, once the eavesdropper can recover
one of the rotated BCs, then only 4! (where ”!” denotes
the factorial) extra operations should be used to recover the
other BC as the mapping is unknown to the eavesdropper.
After the rotated angles are decrypted, there are
 
4
2
2
possible
cases to choose elements from sets N andM . Moreover, we
assume that the sequence of encrypted MCs used to generate
RCR-SCMA codewords is also unknown to the eavesdropper;
hence, the search space of the eavesdropper in this case is
2 ((360 )4+4!)
 
4
2
2
. (
 
a
b

denotes the number of combinations
that choosing b different elements from a elements).
2) 8 > cp > 4: In this case, one of the BCs needs to consider
all possible cases, whereas for the other BC, at most cp   4
different angles can be used for encryption. We assume that l
(l < cp + 4) different angles are used. As a consequence, an
additional
 
4
l
  ( 360 )l operations are required to recover the
rotated BCs. Moreover, the possible number of ways to choose
elements from N andM increases to
 
4+l
2
2
; hence, the total
search space of case 2 is 2  ((360 )4+
 
4
l
  ( 360 )l) 4+l2 2. Note
that when l = 0, case 2 degenerates into case 1.
3) cp  8: In this case, the selected cp angles can be fully
used to rotate the BCs. Therefore, the search space of case
3 can be given as: 2  (2  ( 360 )4)
 
8
2
2
. It should be noted
that the search space in case 3 is the upper bound in 16-point
RCR-SCMA.
For 4-point RCR-SCMA, the unitary search space is given
as 2  (2  ( 360 )2)
 
4
2
2
. As reported in [30], the required
summations and multiplications per OFDMA subcarrier for
Max-log-MPA are calculated as:
Nmultiplications =
(dc + 3)M
dcdu + (du   2)Mdu
  IT +M(du   1)
Naddtions =
(dc + 1)M
dcdu + (M   1)du + (Mdc 1   1)Mdu
  IT
(39)
where IT is the number of iterations. Based on (39) and the
above discussions, the decrypted complexity comparison of
conventional SCMA and RCR-SCMA is presented in Table
III.
As shown in Table III, the complexity required to steal the
conventional codebook by means of exhaustive search is very
low compared with RCR-SCMA. Moreover, the conventional
codebook is fixed; hence, once the codebook is decrypted, an
eavesdropper can recover the transmitted data, as the LUs do.
Taking the simplest RCR-SCMA system with K = 4; J =
6; du = 3; dc = 2 and max(IT ) = 6 as an example, an eaves-
dropper requires approximately 1011:8 2 lg  and 1016:6 2 lg 
operations to search for all possible 4-point and 16-point
RCR-SCMA codebooks, respectively, for a block. It should
be noted that if the eavesdroppers want to recover data
with high accuracy,  should be less than 1. Therefore, the
security of conventional SCMA, from the secret key decrypted
perspective, is very weak compare to that of RCR-SCMA.
Although the decrypted complexity is not sufficiently high
to ensure the perfect security of secret keys, we will determine
the infeasibility to intercept data via brute force attack on
secret keys in the next subsection.
B. Analysis of possible attack methods
1) Post-processing attack: Post-processing attack is similar
to brute force search attack on secret keys in conventional
security systems. Nonetheless, a post-processing attacker is
assumed to be unbounded in time and storage capacity [31].
Hence, the eavesdroppers can store all the signals received
from the BC.
As mentioned in section IV, each RCR-SCMA codebook
encrypted by an independent channel phase is used to transmit
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several bits (a block or several blocks) in a data packet.
To illustrate that RCR-SCMA is immune to post-processing
attack, we detect one block for a LU by employing exhaustive
search on all possible codebooks in a 16-point RCR-SCMA
system. Fig. 13 depicts the proportion of codebooks that result
in different numbers of error bits in a block for different
Eb=N0.
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Fig. 13: Proportion of codebooks causing different numbers of error
bits in a block by means of exhaustive search
In Fig. 13, we can observe that approximately 6% of the
codebooks can recover the original block without any errors
for all Eb=N0. Moreover, more than 25% of the codebooks can
recover the original block with only one error bit. Therefore,
the eavesdropper cannot even judge whether the decrypted
codebook they use is correct by analyzing the recovered
information bits. Additionally, the proportion is weakly related
to the channel Eb=N0. Therefore, the correct codebook is
hardly decrypted under any Eb=N0. According to the above
discussions, the eavesdropper can only apply brute force
search on information bits. However, the complexity will be
extremely high even though a post-processing eavesdropper
can store all the transmitted signals.
2) Intelligent attack: In contrast to a brute force attack or
post-processing attack, an intelligent attacker has the ability
to estimate the CSI between the BS and LUs with certain
accuracy [32]. Such an attacker model is similar to the analysis
shown in section V-B. If an intelligent attacker is able to guess
the rotated angles of each BC with very high accuracy, the
encrypted codebook can be decrypted, according to section
V-B. Although the previous appointed mappings between
constellation points on the BC and the index of vector hj
are unknown, it is easy to obtain the mappings via exhaustive
search because they are fixed. However, we have noted another
case that results in a high error rate in section V-B, namely, the
variation of symbol mappings on MCs due to the estimation
error.
By combining these two cases, the error rate performance
of an intelligent eavesdropper is plotted versus the maximum
deviation of the angle (max) caused by approximation error
at the eavesdropper’s side in Fig. 14. We test 106 codebooks
obtained by randomly deviating each point on the BC with an
angle less than max. It should be noted that the possible
variation of the symbol mappings on the MCs should be taken
into consideration in our simulation. The other parameters are
the same as in section V-C.
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Fig. 14: Error rate of an intelligent eavesdropper versus the maximum
deviation of the angle caused by estimation error
As depicted in Fig. 14, for all Eb=N0, the error rate of
the eavesdropper increases as the maximum estimation error
increases. In addition, the gap between BER and BLER
gradually decreases as Eb=N0 increases. For low Eb=N0, the
error rate is sufficiently high to protect confidential informa-
tion. Nonetheless, partial information may be intercepted at
high Eb=N0 because the impact of estimation error weakens.
Therefore, even though the intelligent attacker is powerful
enough to estimate the CSI and guess the rotated angles, the
eavesdropper can still hardly intercept useful data from the BS
if estimation error out of certain range.
Furthermore, our proposed scheme is immune to intelligent
attackers under certain conditions. We intend to determine the
range of angles that can result in variation of the symbol
map on the MC. For simplicity, we only discuss the variation
caused by the x coordinate; the discussion of the y coordinate
is similar. According to the notation in (5), the variation of
the symbol mappings on the MC for a 16-point RCR-SCMA
can be represented as:8><>:
xp > xq
Xp < Xq
jxp   xqj = min
i;j=1;2;3;4
fjxi   xj jg
(40)
where xp and xq are the original x coordinates of points p
and q on the BC, respectively. Xp and Xq are the estimated x
coordinates of an eavesdropper of points p and q, respectively.
As variation of symbol mappings on the MC is most likely
to occur when the x coordinates of points p and q are close,
we assume that jxp   xqj is the minimum value on the BC.
Based on (40), the possible variation of symbol mapping
when designing a codebook can be regarded as the variation
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of coordinates caused by the estimated error. Therefore, the
range of deviated angle  that can cause variation of symbol
mapping on the MC is:
p + q
2
>  >
q   p
2
(41)
For proof, see Appendix A.
C. Practical consideration
According to the previous discussion, we can conclude
that the security of RCR-SCMA is based on the following
three factors: (1) The rotated angles are obtained from the
estimated CSI; hence, the codebook cannot be obtained by
an eavesdropper. (2) Once the BS receive a request to com-
municate from the LUs, new encrypted codebooks can be
generated to transmit several blocks in a data packet; hence,
the eavesdropper cannot verify the validity of a codebook by
analyzing the detected bits. (3) The decrypted complexity for
a block is very high when searching for a possible codebook.
Therefore, the transmitted data can hardly be intercepted if the
eavesdropper wants to recover the data packet by searching for
all possible codebooks in real time.
As mentioned above, the ideal situation is that each block
in a data packet is encrypted with a different RCR-SCMA
codebook. Considering the extra uplink of training bits trans-
mission, CSI estimation and parameter calculations, the trans-
mission rate is sacrificed to improve security. Therefore, to
decrease the delay of our scheme without loss of secrecy
performance, several blocks can be grouped to be transmitted
with one codebook in practical systems.
In practical applications of SCMA, such as IoT networks
in mMTC, where strong ciphers such as advanced encryption
standard (AES) are too costly computationally, the proposed
security scheme operates over the physical layer of the pro-
tocol stack and can be viewed as the first step towards a
somewhat unconventional bottom-up architecture for secure
communications. It can be combined with lightweight ciphers
over higher layers to decrease the complexity while ensuring
sufficient levels of confidentiality. To break the cipher, the
eavesdropper would have to guess both the key and the
random rotated angles introduced by the CSI, which leads to
a significant increase in the search space when performing
cryptanalysis. The combination of secure communication over
the physical layer and powerful cryptographic technologies has
been studied in [33]–[35].
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we developed a novel secure transmission
scheme for a downlink SCMA system over the physical layer,
namely, RCR-SCMA. RCR-SCMA employs the technique of
channel key extraction to scramble the codebook at the trans-
mitter to make it unknown to the eavesdropper. To minimize
the performance loss caused by RCR, we introduced a tight
error rate upper bound for conventional SCMA to guide the
design of the encrypted codebook. The simulation results
confirmed the feasibility of our scheme. Furthermore, we
discussed the IRA and the impact of imperfect CSI estimation
in an RCR-SCMA system. The analysis showed that the
secrecy performance of conventional SCMA is related to IRA
and that RCR-SCMA is relatively robust to channel estimation
error under certain condition. Additionally, we calculated the
decrypted complexity of RCR-SCMA and analyzed the se-
crecy performance of RCR-SCMA under two different attacker
models. In conclusion, our scheme can be used as a valuable
supplement to conventional cryptographic technologies.
APPENDIX A
DERIVATION OF (41)
For simplicity, we assume the impact of the estimation error
on the intelligent eavesdropper is the same. Then, the rotation
matrices of points p and q can be represented as:
Hp =Hq =

cos()   sin()
sin() cos()

(42)
Therefore, we can obtain:
Xp = xp  cos() + yp  sin() (43)
and
Xq = xq  cos() + yq  sin() (44)
According to (41), we have:
xp  cos() + yp  sin() < xq  cos() + yq  sin()
(45)
After rearrangement, (45) can be written as:
tan() <
xq   xp
yp   yq (46)
As (xp; yp) and (xq; yq) are the original coordinates of points p
and q and, without loss of generality, we assume
q
x2p + y
2
p =q
x2q + y
2
q = 1, (46) can be rewritten as:
tan() <
cos(q)  cos(p)
sin(p)  sin(q)
=
 2 sin(p + q
2
) sin(
q   p
2
)
2 cos(
p + q
2
) sin(
p   q
2
)
= tan(
p + q
2
)
(47)
Considering the arctan function is monotonically increasing,
 must satisfy:
 <
p + q
2
(48)
If p and q rotate in opposite directions, (43) and (44) can
be rewritten as:
Xp = xp  cos() + yp  sin() (49)
and
Xq = xq  cos()  yq  sin() (50)
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Similar to the case where p and q rotate in the same direction,
we can obtain:
cot() >
sin(q) + sin(p)
cos(q)  cos(p)
=
2 sin(
p + q
2
) cos(
p   q
2
)
 2 sin(p + q
2
) sin(
p   q
2
)
= cot(
q   p
2
)
(51)
Therefore,
 >
p   q
2
(52)
Combining (48) and (52), the range of  is:
p + q
2
>  >
q   p
2
(53)
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